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ABSTRACT
Quality and the costs of health care are of concern among patients. 
Differing from previous research into hospital competition, this 
article captures the impact of price subsidy of public hospitals on 
the quality of private hospitals, considering both horizontal and 
vertical product differentiation by employing a two-stage dynamic 
game under Cournot and Stackelberg competition. Firstly, the 
results of this study indicate that medical reimbursement of public 
hospitals has stimulating effects on the quality of private hospitals 
and the improvement of quality is related to the degree of hospital 
competition. Second, the quality of health care and patients’ surplus 
and social welfare are the highest under Stackelberg competition 
if the public hospital is the leader while the private hospital is the 
follower. Finally, the demand for health care rises with the price 
subsidy of public hospitals. These conclusions have significant policy 
implications for health care system reform, especially for China.
1. Introduction
With China’s unprecedented economic growth and success in lifting millions out of poverty, 
the level of national health improved significantly. Meanwhile, diseases related to diet, such 
as obesity, cardiovascular disease, diabetes and others caused by smoking and drinking have 
become increasingly prominent. It has led to a dramatic increase in China’s demand for 
health care and greater health expenditure. Recently, China’s health reform programmes 
have successfully widened the availability of health care services. On one hand, the basic 
health insurance coverage has extended to the general population (Yip et al., 2012). On the 
other hand, private capital is allowed to enter the market to compete with the public sector. 
Establishing and improving the health care protection system aims to ensure more people 
are covered with reasonable medical resources. In other words, more and more people 
should be able to see doctors under regulated costs. The investment of medical insurance 
improves people’s health but seriously increases government financial burden.
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In China, there are two types of hospitals, public hospitals and non-public hospitals. 
Public hospitals dominate the health care industry in terms of market share and the China 
Health Statistics Yearbook 2015 shows that public hospitals occupy nearly 90% of the market 
share measured by total treated patients. Private hospitals only hold 10.9% of the market 
share but recently that has started increasing. Many factors result in that structure, but a 
major reason for it is that patients can be reimbursed for hospitalisation expenses when 
they see doctors in public hospitals. But the expenditures of seeing a doctor at a private 
hospital are not included in the basic health insurance programme, which means patients 
at private hospitals would not receive any reimbursement from the government for their 
medical treatment.
The reimbursement is actually a kind of price subsidy to public hospitals. Under the price 
subsidy of public hospitals, it is difficult for private hospitals to initiate price competition and 
therefore they may try to differentiate themselves by improving the quality of their products 
and services. With the increase of income, people need better medical quality and different 
medical care services. Many upscale private hospitals, such as the United Family Hospital 
that mainly services the well-off, have emerged to satisfy the general medical care market.
Whether competition between public and private hospitals can play a positive role in 
the health care market remains a controversial topic in both developed and developing 
countries. Quality is a major concern in health care. Many scholars think that competition 
can promote health care quality and reduce health care costs. Employing empirical data, 
Pan et al. (2015) showed that hospital competition is significantly correlated with shorter 
outpatient waiting time and lower patient costs. Eggleston and Yip (2004) developed a model 
of public-private hospital competition under regulated prices, and used data from China 
to calibrate a simulation model of the impact of China’s recent payment and organisational 
reforms on cost and quality.
Our research aims to capture the effects of medical insurance reimbursement on the 
quality and quantity competition in the hospital industry by adopting different game mod-
els. Our results indicate reimbursement of public hospital stimulates the total medical 
care demand and improves the quality of private hospital. Moreover, the speed of quality 
improvement is the fastest and total utility of patients is the largest in the Stackelberg case 
when the public hospital is the leader and the private hospital is the follower.
The rest of this article is organised as follows. Literature review is outlined in section 
2 to offer an overall review of the prior research. Then this article sets up Cournot and 
Stackelberg competition models in section 3. And we will give the propositions after model 
analysis in section 4. In the last section concluding remarks and some discussions are given.
2. Literature review
Nearly all countries enforce medical insurance because it improves the average health 
condition of the population. Some researchers showed that medical insurance is condu-
cive to health. Using survey data for urban residents, Pan et al. (2013) found that medical 
insurance can improve the health of insured people. Finkelstein et al. (2012) implied that 
Oregon’s OHP (Oregon Health Plan)  standard (one kind of medical insurance) plays a 
significantly positive role in mental health, but has no effect on mortality. There are also 
authors who advocate that medical insurance significantly promotes health service utilisa-
tion, and improves people’s health status (Currie & Gruber,  1996a, 1996b; Hanratty, 1996; 
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Xie, 2009). Besides, medical insurance eased the personal medical burden and stimulated 
medical demand (MaCall et al., 1991; Finkelstein et al., 2012) and the rising of demand led 
to higher health costs (Hu, Luan, & Li, 2015). Unfortunately, this research mainly focuses 
on the effect of medical insurance coverage, but there is little literature that focused on the 
effect of medical reimbursement rate on medial quality and demand. Zhao, Zeng, and Yin 
(2015) got the optimal health insurance reimbursement rate by constructing individual 
utility and social welfare maximisation and validated that China’s current Urban Resident 
Basic Medical Insurance and New Rural Basic Medical Insurance have not reached the 
optimal reimbursement rate using a city-level data set collected from a ‘natural experi-
ment’. They also studied the effects of health insurance reimbursement rate on utilisation 
of in-patient services.
Another favourable factor for health improvement is competition of hospitals because 
competition forces hospitals to enhance their quality. Ongoing reforms in several countries 
to stimulate competition and patient choice in hospital markets have highlighted the impor-
tance of establishing more understanding about the relationship between competition and 
quality. There is vast research on hospital competition. Gaynor (2006) identified key issues 
concerning the nature of competition in health care markets and its impacts on quality 
and social welfare from the theoretical and empirical literatures. Theoretical models about 
hospital competition are mostly based on the hotelling model (Brekke, Siciliani, & Staume, 
2008). The existing theoretical literature, though relatively scant, is clear that competition 
increases quality and improves consumer welfare, although the impacts on social welfare are 
ambiguous (Ma & Burgess, 1993; Calem & Rizzo, 1995; Gravelle & Masiero, 2000; Brekke, 
Nuscheler, & Straume, 2006, 2007). Empirical work in this issue is growing rapidly, but the 
empirical evidence implied an ambiguous relationship between competition and hospital 
quality. A few studies, including Kessler and McClellan (2000) and Tay (2003), found a 
positive relationship. Chen and Cheng (2010) examined the effects of market competition 
on patient-perceived quality of service under a single-payer system in Taiwan. They found 
that quality of service from the patient’s perspective is sensitive to the degree of competition 
using patient-reported data. Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) showed a negative relation-
ship while Mukamel, Zwanziger, and Tomaszewski (2001) found no effects. However, many 
authors believed that market competition is the most efficient approach to address health 
care challenges.
In this work, we extend and generalise the received theoretical literature by simulta-
neously including: (1) heterogeneous patients, and for-profit providers; (2) convex costs 
that are non-separable in quantity and quality; (3) both horizontal and vertical product 
differentiation in different quality and price subsidy; and (4) comparative analysis under 
Cournot and Stackelberg competition. Our research aims to examine the effects of medical 
insurance on quality and the relationship between the degree of hospital competition and 
quality considering both horizontal and vertical product differentiation.
3. The model
Residents
The model of two hospitals is formally established next. Assume all residents buy the basic 
medical insurance. Residents are endowed with a utility function separable in wealth and 
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benefits derived from reimbursement that government provides and hospital care. A resident 
demands one unit of hospital care that means we do not consider repeated consumption 
because information is symmetric and one-time consumption has no different from repeated 
consumption. Reimbursement that the government provides is τi. When a resident takes 
one episode of hospital care from the private hospital, he or she can get no reimbursement 
or 
1
=0 but higher quality q1. In this study, quality means medical treatment technology 
and service level of the hospital. If the patient choose the public hospital, he or she can get 
reimbursed for 𝜏
2
, 0 < 𝜏
2
< 1 fraction of the expenses,1 and quality q2. With private capital 
entering markets to compete with public sector and increase of income, many non-public 
hospitals with high quality emerge to appeal to the demands of people. So here, we further 
assume q1 > q2. Without losing of generality, we focus on quality of the private hospital 
and standardise q2to 0 to simplify the model.
2 On the other hand, public hospital is strictly 
regulated by the government, so it has low motivation to improve the quality of its service 
and we standardise its quality to constant. We can be liberated to focus our attention on 
the effect of reimbursement ratio τ2 on the quality of private hospital.
Because both wealth and medical treatment or service quality of hospitals increase res-
idents’ utilities, we employ the Cobb-Douglas utility for residents. Then the utility for a 
resident is:
 
and representative consumer (resident) surplus (cs) functions is
 
α uniformly distribute in [1,2] represents the wealth of the resident.3 pi, (i = 1, 2) is the 
prices. The demand function is determined by (2). If a resident selects the private hospital, 
the following relationship holds: cs1 > cs2. This indicates that:
 
Assume the total population is 1with wealth evenly distribute in [1, 2]. Accordingly, we 
obtain the demand for medical care of the private hospital
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Accordingly, we obtain the demand for health treatment of the public hospital as:
 
And the corresponding inverse demands are:
 
And consumer surpluses are outlined as the following:
 
Hospitals
Here we model the two hospitals in this industry which offer products and service with 
different medical quality but only the public hospitals acquire medical insurance from the 
government.
The objective functions of the two hospitals are as follows.
 




i qi is the cost function and it is a quadratic function. The 
cost function is convex in quantity and linear in quality. The first term represents the costs 
result in quality and the second term means the costs of quantity. The last term or x2i qi is 
used to capture the ‘learning effect’, which means hospital costs decrease as cured patients 
and quality increase because a health treatment and quality increase will improve the expe-
rience of the hospital and will subsequently reduce the cost (Jaber & Saadany, 2011; Wahab 
& Jaber, 2010). ‘Learning effect’ lowers the cost, so the sign of x2i qi minus.
The timing of the game is as follows: At the first stage, the two hospitals commit the qual-
ity level of their products and service. At the second stage, according to the quality levels, 
patients determine whether to go to hospital and choose the hospital (public or private), 
while the hospitals make their capacity decision to meet the patients’ need. Hospitals decide 
the quantity of the products. All solutions are obtained by backward induction.
3.1. Cournot-Nash model
Cournot competition is used as our benchmark model. Cournot competition is nearly to prefect 






























































































1214   C. WANG AND Y. CHEN
moves. All the members of the channel determine their own strategies simultaneously and 
non-cooperatively. In this situation, the first optimal conditions of function (9) are:
 
Solving equation (10) we obtain the equilibrium solutions of quality:
 
the equilibrium solutions of quantity:
 
and the equilibrium prices are as follows:
 
3.2. Stackelberg case 1
In this case, the public hospital is the leader and the private hospital is the follower. Solving 
function (9) by backward induction, which means we get the first optimal conditions of the 
follower hospital and they are outlined as:
 
Then we obtain the response function x1 = f(x2). Substitute x1 = f(x2) into the profits func-
tion of the public hospital and solve it, we have the following first optimal condition of the 
leader hospital:
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the equilibrium solutions of quantity are as follows:
 
and the equilibrium solutions of price are:
 
3.3. Stackelberg case 2
In this Stackelberg game case, the private hospital is the leader and the public hospital is 
the follower. The equilibrium solutions of the follower or the public hospital is decided by 
the following first optimal condition:
 
and response function of the follower x2 = f
'(x1). Substitute x2 = f
'(x1) to the profit function 
of the leader and solve it, we obtain the following first optimal condition:
 




and the equilibrium solutions of price:
 
4. Comparative analysis
Here, we will carry on comparative analysis among the above three games and some inter-
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4.1. Quality analysis
Quality is a concern in health care. Patients are sensitive to quality and very concerned 
about a hospital’s medical technology. Though public hospitals in China have inherent 
advantages in medical technology, the improvement of quality has fallen behind the growth 
in demand. With a great demand on health care, the relationship between patients and 
doctors are increasingly important. Presently, many high quality private hospitals emerged 




















Proof. See the appendix. ■
Remarks: The reimbursement of public hospital motivates the private hospital to improve 
its quality. Stimulating effects of reimbursement under Stackelberg case 1 is bigger than that 
under Cournot. The quality of the private hospital is the highest when the public hospital 
is the leader and the private hospital is the follower but the least under Stackelberg case 2. 
Proposition 1 indicates that the private hospital can offset its competition disadvantage by 
increasing its quality. More importantly, the fiercer the competition of the public hospital, 
the higher the quality of the private hospital. The market structure that public hospitals 
dominate can be more conducive to improving medical technology and that is the reality 
in today’s China.
4.2. Demand analysis
With the development of the economy, people pay more attention to their health and more 





















Proof. See the appendix. ■
Remarks: Reimbursement makes the public hospital more attractive to the patients than 
the private hospital. As a result, more and more residents choose the public hospital when 
they are sick. The total demand for health care increases with the reimbursement ratio. 
Interestingly, with the price subsidy to the public hospital, the market share of the private 
hospital will never exceed 1
2
 or half of the market, no matter what its quality is. On one hand, 
the price subsidy of the public hospital lightens the burden of medical care of residents. 
On the other hand, incomes have gone up. A growing number of people can afford to pay 
hospital bills. However, the price subsidy of the public hospital limits peoples’ desire to use 
private hospitals for medical care. 𝜕q1
𝜕𝜏
2
> 0 and x1

2
≤ 0 implicate that the private hospital 
should allow a trade-off between quantity and quality, or the private hospital should increase 
its quality to offset the market share disadvantage.
4.3. Price analysis









Proof. See the appendix. ■
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Remarks: The results are acquired in all three games. The reimbursement of the public 
hospital raises its price but reduces the price of the private hospital. Although patients who 
go to the public hospital are reimbursed, they are faced with higher prices for medical care 
and services. In other words, price reimbursement has both positive and negative effects 
on patients and the gross effects are weaker than expected.
Therefore, another competitive strategy for the private hospital is to lower its price of 
medical treatments and services under price subsidy. Furthermore, 𝜕p2
𝜕𝜏
2
> 0 illustrates that 
the government should use price reimbursement carefully because price reimbursement 
enable the public hospital with the power to increase its price and all the reimbursement 
may offset by the price increase effects in extreme condition.
4.4. Patients’ surplus
Patients’ surplus is a concept that is similar to consumers’ surplus. Combining function (7) 
and (8), we have the total patients’ surplus given as the following
 
And function (24) and the equilibrium prices of the three cases imply the following 
Proposition.
Proposition 4 CS* < CS*** < CS**.
Proof. See the appendix. ■
Remarks: Proposition 4 shows that patients’ surplus is the largest in the public- leader–
Stacklberg case and it is the least in Cournot. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the viewpoint by 
numerical analysis.
Consequently, letting the private capital enter the market to compete with the public 
sector is an effective health care reform policy, which is of great benefit to patients in China. 
Moreover, the benefit to patients is the greatest in such market structure in which the public 
hospital is dominant.
4.5. Social welfare
Another important factor we care about is social welfare, so next we will compare the social 
welfare under the above three games.
Denote the social welfare as SW, and then we have
 
And function (25) indicates the following Proposition.






∈ (0, 0.85), then SW* < SW*** < SW**.
Proof. See the appendix. ■
Remarks: Social welfare is the largest under Stackelberg case 1 and the least under Cournot 
competition. From social welfare perspectives, Stackelberg case 1 is the best. In other words, 
public hospitals leading the private ones is the best for the whole society. Figures 3 and 4 
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illustrate the viewpoint by numerical analysis. Although Proposition 5 only holds under the 
constraint that 
2
∈ (0, 0.85) and this interval is determined by mathematical technology, 
actually the reimbursement ratio of the public hospital is less than 80%, so this constraint 
can be ignored.
The results show that the improvement of social welfare is related to the competition 
structure or public leader–private follower Stackelberg competition is best of all. So, the 
policy implications of Proposition 3 and 4 indicate that the government should give private 
hospitals the chance to compete with public hospitals, but on the other hand, the government 
should enforce some regulations on private hospitals because they are less consumer-ori-
ented organisations compared with public hospitals. 
5. Conclusion
Considering the price subsidy of public hospitals and quality difference, this article analyses 
both the quality and the degree of hospital competition. From the existing literature we 
take both quality and price difference into consideration. By using a two-stage dynamic 
game under Cournot and Stackelberg competition, we argue that medical reimbursement 
of the public hospital has motivating effects on the quality of the private hospital, and the 
effects are the largest in the Stackelberg case where the public hospital is the leader while 
the private hospital is the follower. The improvement of quality is related to the degree of 
hospital competition, which is different from the conclusion obtained by Chen and Cheng 
(2011). Chen and Cheng found that competition was positively associated with the perceived 
quality of care empirically, but we argued that there is an optimal degree of competition 
that makes quality of health care improved faster theoretically. Correspondingly, we obtain 
the demand for health care rises with price subsidy of the public hospital. The results have 
been tested by many researchers (MaCall et al., 1991; Finkelstein et al., 2012).
With the improvement in quality of private hospitals and a rapid increase in income, more 
and more people will prefer private hospitals with higher quality. By comparing patients’ 
surplus and social welfare we demonstrate that patients’ surplus and social welfare are the 
largest under the public leader–private follower Stackelberg competition.
Cournot competition is our benchmark model and we compare the results in Stackelberg 
cases with the benchmark condition. Actually, the public hospital leader Stackelberg com-
petition is almost the reality for the Chinese hospital industry because public hospitals 
dominate the competition. This study is based on Chinese medical markets, and it indicates 
that the present market structure of hospital competition with public hospitals playing the 
leader role is rational and price subsidy of public hospital can stimulate private hospital to 
make further efforts to increase medical treatment technology and its service quality. In 
other words, our conclusions have great policy implications for the government of China or 
even other similar countries. Capacity constraints (Chen, Nie, & Wang, 2015) and corporate 
social responsibility (Chen, Wen, & Lou, 2016) are two major factors that impact hospitals 
competition because hospitals operate with capacity constraints (limited hospital beds or 
limited doctors) and corporate social responsibility (hospitals are not complete profit max-
imisation firms). Further study will take those factors into account.




= 0 means no reimbursement while 
2
= 1 indicates free medical treatment both are out 
of our study.
2.  q2 is the basic quality of hospital service and we have q1  >  q2. There is no difference to 
standardise q2 to 0, 1 or any other constant because the only important thing is q1 > q2. If q2 
is not standardised to 0, then only need is to employ a new parameter Δq = q1 - q2, but that 
is nothing more than making the analysis complex, so we assume q2 = 0.
3.  α ∊ [1, 2] not [0, 1] because τ ∊ (0, 1). If α ∊ [0, 1], then the wealth level is too low comparing 
with the reimbursement or the reimbursement of the public hospital is too high and that will 
let to unacceptable results.
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Proof of Proposition 1
























































































Conclusions are therefore achieved and the proof is complete. ■
Proof of Proposition 2



































































































































Conclusions are therefore achieved and the proof is complete. ■
Proof of Proposition 3





























































































< 0 and 𝜕p2
𝜕𝜏
2
> 0are all assured for three competitions.
Conclusions are therefore achieved and the proof is complete. ■
Proof of Proposition 4
From function (24) and the equilibrium solutions of the three cases, we 












> 0 and 













2 > 0 .
To illustrate this better, we offer the numerical simulation as follows (Figures 1 and 2).
Conclusions are therefore achieved and the proof is complete. ■
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Figure 1. numerical simulation of τ2. source:  simulated by the authors with mathematica 9.0.





Figure 2. numerical simulation of CS** - CS***. source: simulated by the authors with mathematica 9.0.
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Proof of Proposition 5
If 0 < 𝜏 < 𝜏
2
 and τ ∊ (0, 0.85) then we have 




















> 0 and 
SW


























The result obtained by numerical simulation for the expressions are quite complex (see Figures 3 
and 4).
Conclusions are therefore achieved and the proof is complete. ■





Figure 3. numerical simulation of SW** - SW***. source:  simulated by the authors with mathematica 9.0.





Figure 4. numerical simulation of SW*** - SW*. source:  simulated by the authors with mathematica 9.0.
